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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF NASSAU, 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-3 691 
ANGELINA SINICROPI. 
Charging Party. 
ANGELINA SINICROPI. pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Angelina 
Sinicropi to a decision of the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing her charge 
against the County of Nassau (County) as not being timely 
1/ 2/ 
filed.- The charge was filed on November 16. 1978,-
I/section 204.1(a)(1) of our Rules of Procedure permits 
the filing of an improper practice charge only within four 
months of the conduct complained of. 
2/The charge was withdrawn conditionally in March 1979. 
Sinicropi had commenced a proceeding in court to review her 
disciplinary discharge by the County. It was stipulated that 
the charge would be withdrawn subject to reopening if the court 
did not address the issues involved in the improper practice 
case. The disciplinary discharge was eventually confirmed 
(Sinicropi v. Bennett. 60 NY2d 918 [1983]). but the court's 
decision did not deal with the improper practice issues. The 
matter was then reopened on Sinicropi's motion. 
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and complains that the County brought disciplinary charges 
against Sinicropi on June 20, 1978 in retaliation for her 
having filed a grievance and engaged in other protected 
activities. 
In her exceptions, Sinicropi argues that the instant 
charge grows out of the same circumstances as were complained 
3/ 
about in an earlier case.— Thus, according to Sinicropi, 
the timeliness of the earlier charge should be imputed to the 
second. 
We affirm the decision of the Director. The two charges 
present distinct causes of action and. as noted by the 
Director, the second cause of action was not brought within 
the time authorized by Rule 204.1(a)(1). 
l/u-2846. In this charge Sinicropi complains that 
the County interfered with her attempt to file a grievance 
in August, 1977. which incident allegedly provoked the 
retaliatory disciplinary action referred to in the instant 
charge. That charge, too, was conditionally withdrawn in 
March. 1979 and reopened in 1984. It has been assigned to 
an Administrative Law Judge for disposition on the merits. 
§137 
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NOW. THEREFORE, we Order that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: July 19, 1984 
Albany, New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PLAINVIEW-OLD BETHPAGE CENTRAL 
SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7059 
PLAINVIEW-OLD BETHPAGE CONGRESS OF 
TEACHERS, NEA - NY/NEA. 
Charging Party, 
-and-
PLAINVIEW-OLD BETHPAGE CHAIRPERSONS' 
ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor, 
CAMPANELLA & GUERCIO. P.C., for Respondent 
ROBERT D. CLEARFIELD. ESQ. (JANET AXELROD. ESQ.. of 
Counsel), for Charging Party 
ROBERT SAPERSTEIN. ESQ.. for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Plainview-Old Bethpage Central School District (District) 
to the decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that 
it violated its duty to negotiate in good faith with the 
Plainview-Old Bethpage Congress of Teachers. NEA - NY/NEA 
A 
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(Congress) in that it executed a "parity" agreement with 
the Plainview-Old Bethpage Chairpersons' Association 
(Association) which tied certain benefits of the 
chairpersons to future negotiations with the Congress. The 
record establishes that the District and the Association 
entered into a collective bargaining agreement on May 25, 
1984 which, among other things, assured chairpersons of any 
benefits that the Congress might achieve in subsequent 
negotiations on behalf of teachers dealing with workers' 
compensation, health insurance and several other matters. 
The District and the Association, which was permitted to 
intervene in the proceeding, argued that their agreement 
upon this parity clause was not improper.— Relying on 
our decisions in City of New York. 10 PERB 1P003 (1977). 
and Rockville Centre Principals Assn. « 12 PERB 1F3021 
(1979), the ALJ found that it was. 
The District and the Association argue that the Court 
of Appeals in Niagara-Wheatfield Administrators Association 
v. Niaoara-Wheatfield CSD. 44 NY2d 68. 11 PERB ir7512 (1978) 
and the Appellate Division, Third Dept. in City of 
1/The ALJ determined that the Congress did not amend 
its charge to complain about the conduct of the 
Association, and he found no violation by the Association. 
The Congress filed no exceptions and the issue is therefore 
not before us. 
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Schenectady. 85 AD2d 116, 15 PERB T7510 (1982), have 
determined that an agreement providing a parity clause is 
not improper. They further argue that, to the extent that 
these court decisions do not overrule our own decisions. 
City of New York should be distinguished on the ground that 
the employer there not only executed a parity clause but 
also used the clause as a shield against negotiation 
demands made by the union which bore the parity burden. 
2/ This, it alleges, has not happened here.— 
Two other defenses raised by the District and the 
Association relate to the timing of the charge. The record 
shows that there was a similar parity clause in two prior 
agreements between the District and the Association 
covering a period of six years. They argue that by not 
objecting to that clause in the past, the Congress is 
barred by laches from objecting now. They also contend 
that the charge is not timely because it was brought four 
months and one day after the District's agreement with the 
Association was executed, 
We find that the Congress is not barred by laches from 
filing the charge herein. Laches is an eguitable defense 
that applies when there has been an excessive delay in 
-^'At the time when the charge was filed, the Congress 
and the District had not yet commenced their negotiations. 
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asserting a right which prejudices an adverse party. There 
is no showing that the District or the Association have 
been prejudiced by the Congress' failure to contest the 
parity clauses in the prior agreements. Further, the 
failure of a union to object to improper conduct by an 
employer in one year does not amount to a waiver such as to 
preclude it from objecting to similar improper conduct 
3/ taken in subsequent years.— We also find no basis for 
concluding that the charge is not timely. There is no 
showing in the record that the Congress was aware of the 
contract between the District and the Association on the 
date of its execution. Thus, we conclude, its charge was 
brought within four months of the time when it knew or 
should have known of the alleged violation. 
The rejection of these defenses confronts us with the 
parity issue.-'' In City of Albany. 7 PERB 1P079 (1974), 
this Board held parity to be a nonmandatory subject of 
negotiation. Later, in City of New York, we held parity to 
3/compare CSEA v. Newman. 88 AD2d 685 (3d Dept., 
1982), 15 PERB ir7011. aff'd NY2d (1984), 17 PERB 
ir7007. 
^The Association argues that the Congress has no 
standing to bring a charge attacking its contract with the 
District because it is not a party to that contract. This 
argument is integrally related to the question of the 
validity of the parity clause. 
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be a prohibited subject of negotiation "by reason of its 
inhibiting effect upon related collective 
negotiations".— In Niaqara-Wheatfield. the Court of 
Appeals ruled that a contract clause calling for the 
continuation of a contractual benefit was valid; the 
contract benefit in guestion was an assurance of parity. 
We nevertheless indicated our adherence to City of New York 
when the issue of parity next came before us in Rockville 
Centre. We reasoned that the Court of Appeals had not 
focused on the fact that the contract benefit being 
continued was a parity clause and that its specific and 
limited holding concerned the legality of a proposal for a 
continuation of benefits. 
The issue next surfaced in City of Schenectady. The 
underlying facts were that the police and firefighters 
employed by Schenectady had negotiated a series of 
contracts jointly which contained parity clauses. An 
arbitrator awarded a benefit to the firefighters after the 
City had granted it to the police. Relying upon this 
Board's decisions, the City, unsuccessfully, contested the 
arbitrator's award. The Appellate Division rejected "any 
6 / per se invalidation of such [parity] clauses".— 
i./Supra, at p. 3010. 
6/Supra, at p. 7531. 
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Upon reconsideration, we believe that the police and 
firefighters' joint negotiations in the Schenectady case 
require us to reconsider our analysis of parity in prior 
decisions to the extent that we held a parity clause to be 
prohibited in all circumstances. A parity agreement is 
improper only to the extent that it trespasses upon the 
negotiation rights of a union that is not a party to the 
agreement. It does so by making it more difficult for the 
nonparty union to negotiate some benefits for employees it 
represents while imposing upon it a burden of negotiating 
for employees it does not represent. As evidenced by the 
facts in Schenectady, however, it cannot be assumed that 
the nonparty union will always object to the intrusion upon 
its negotiation rights affected by the parity agreement. 
We therefore agree with the court in Schenectady that there 
is no policy reason for barring parity clauses agreed to by 
both unions in joint bargaining with the employer or 
otherwise consented to by the nonparty union. 
Our prior decisions failed to give sufficient 
recognition to the fact that litigation of parity clauses 
may not involve the rights of a non-party union, but only 
the rights of the parties to the parity agreement. The 
above-cited court decisions involved only the parties to 
the parity agreement. In sustaining arbitration awards 
) 
€|1 
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growing out of disputes between those parties, the courts 
perceived the dispositive public policy to be that set 
forth by the Court of Appeals in District No. 3 v. 
Associated Teachers of Huntington. 30 NY2d 122. 5 PERB 
1f7057 (1972): having reached an agreement with the union a 
public employer should not be able to disavow it because it 
finds that the agreement has become disadvantageous. 
Nevertheless, with respect to a nonparty union—the 
unwilling bargaining representative--we continue to believe 
that the policies underlying the Taylor Law require a 
different result. In our view, the interference with the 
rights of a union that may be effected by a parity i^ " 
agreement between an employer and another union is an 
improper practice within the exclusive jurisdiction of this 
Board. 
Not being party to the parity agreement, a union may 
seek to vindicate its rights by bringing an improper 
practice charge before this Board. The parties to a parity 
agreement, in the ensuing improper practice proceeding, may 
defend their conduct by showing that the charging party had 
consented to the intrusion upon its negotiation rights. 
Such would have been the case had the joint bargaining 
situation in Schenectady- emerged as an iip.'nro'ner practice 
proceeding. 
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This analysis leads us to the conclusion that a parity 
clause is subject to nullification but is not prohibited 
per se. The relevant circumstances supporting the voiding 
of a parity clause can be established only in a timely 
improper practice charge brought by a union alleging that 
the parity clause trespasses upon its negotiation rights. 
We now have before us such an improper practice 
charge, and the evidence is clear that the Congress did not 
consent to the parity clause. The Association contends 
that the parity clause itself does not trespass upon the 
negotiation rights of the Congress; only the use of that 
clause by the District as a shield to resist negotiation 
demands by the other union would be objectionable. It 
asserts that no such use of the parity clause was alleged 
7/ in the instant case.— 
We reject this attempted distinction between the 
parity clause and its effect. The parity clause may not 
become an explicit issue in the Congress1 subsequent 
negotiations, but its effect will inevitably be present in 
the minds of the negotiators and constrict negotiating 
rights. The Connecticut State Labor Relations Board has 
dealt with this problem persuasively in City of New London. 
IUTD o T O C O / t nn o\ T «. v. -. •; J . 
ViL J. — £. £i If U \ J. ? / *J ) . J. L. D O I U • 
Z / s e e f o o t n o t e 1 . 
rar H>-
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What we find to be forbidden is an agreement 
between one group (e.g. firemen) and the 
employer that will impose equality for the 
future upon another group (e.g. policemen) that 
has had no part in making the agreement. We 
find that the inevitable tendency of such an 
agreement is to interfere with, restrain and 
coerce the right of the later group to have 
untrammeled bargaining. And this affects all 
the -latex negotiations (within- the ..-scope of-.-..the 
parity clause) even though it may be hard or 
impossible to trace by proof the effect of the 
parity clause upon any specific terms of the 
later contract (just as in the case before 
us). The parity clause will seldom surface in 
the later negotiations but it will surely be 
present in the minds of the negotiators and 
have a restraining or coercive effect not 
always consciously realized. And while the 
evidence in the present case may not have shown 
a specific connection between the parity clause 
and the terms of the Police contract, it 
certainly did not indicate the lack of such 
connection. The economic terms offered to 
policemen and finally accepted by them were 
just the same as those previously given to the 
firemen, (emphasis in original) 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of 
the ALJ. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the District: 
1. Cease and desist from giving effect t 
the parity provision contained in the 
present agreement with the 
Plainview-Old Bethpage Chairpersons' 
Association; 
2. Cease and desist from agreeing to a 
contract provision that would require 
it to automatically tie in benefits o 
Board - U-7059 
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3. 
employees in the unit represented by 
the Association to the yet-to-be 
negotiated benefits of employees in the 
•unit represented by the Congress. 
Post a notice in the form attached at 
all locations ordinarily used to 
communicate information to its 
employees. 
DATED: July 19. 1984 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
m 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE 10 ILL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all our employees that the Plainview-Old Bethpage Central 
School District 
1. Will not give effect to the parity provision contained 
in the present agreement with the Plainview-Old Bethpage 
Chairpersons' Association; 
2„ Will not agree to a contract provision that would require 
us to automatically tie in benefits of employees in the 
unit represented by the Association to the yet-to-be 
negotiated benefits of employees in the unit represented 
by the Congress. 
Plainview-Old Bethpage Central School Dist, 
Dated. By. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. Q\^ J Q 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROCKLAND COUNTY - SHERIFF'S 
CORRECTION OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, 
CASE NO. D-0230 
Upon the charge of a violation of 
Section 210.1 oJE^ tJie Civil Service 
Law. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the application of the 
Rockland County Sheriff's Correction Officers Association 
(Association) for restoration of the dues and agency shop fee 
deduction privileges afforded under Section 208 of the Civil 
Service Law. The Association's privileges had been suspended 
indefinitely by an order of this Board dated October 29, 
1982. At that time we determined that the Association had 
violated CSL §210.1 by engaging in a one day strike against 
the County of Rockland on June 22, 1981. We ordered that the 
Association's dues deduction privileges and agency shop fee 
deduction privileges, if any, should be suspended 
indefinitely, provided that it "may apply to this Board at any 
time after twelve months have elapsed from the commencement 
of the forfeiture for the restoration of such dues deduction 
privileges." The application was to be supported by proof of 
good faith compliance with CSL §210.1 since the violation 
- Si 
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found, and accompanied by an affirmation that the 
Association no longer asserts the right to strike, as 
required by CSL §210.3(g). 
The Association has submitted an affirmation that it 
does not assert the right to strike against any government 
and we have ascertained that its deduction privileges were 
suspended effective with the pay period commencing May 28, 
1983. and that it has not engaged in, caused, instigated, 
encouraged or condoned a strike against the County of 
Rockland since the date of the above-stated violation. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the indefinite suspension 
of the dues and agency shop fee 
deduction privileges of the Rockland 
County Sheriff's Correction Officers 
Association be. and it hereby is, 
terminated. 
DATED: July 19. 1984 
Albany, New York 
mm 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
FREWSBURG CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT CASE NO. E-0973 
Upon the Application for Designation of 
Persons as Managerial or Confidential. 
S. RALPH MARRA. for Frewsburg Central School District 
JOHN W. CAMPION, for Frewsburg Faculty Association 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Frewsburg 
Faculty Association (Association) to a decision of the Director 
of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
holding Thomas Sharp to be a managerial employee. 
Sharp is employed as a high school administrative 
assistant. That position has been in existence since 1974 and 
involved part-time work for a teacher who received an annual 
stipend above his normal salary. In 1983 his duties were 
expanded to include some responsibilities that had been 
exercised by the former business manager of the Frewsburg 
Central School District (District). The former business 
manager had been a member of the District's team in 
negotiations with custodial employees. He left the employment 
mH9 
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of the District in 1983 to accept a position with a BOCES which 
services the District. As part of his duties in his new 
position, he continues to serve as a negotiator for the 
District. Some of his negotiation-related duties, however, 
were assigned to Sharp. Sharp's new job description provides, 
inter alia: 
IV. Negotiations and Contract Administration 
A. Will help to frame proposals for 
non-teaching contract negotiations. 
B. Will provide background data during the 
course of non-teaching negotiations. 
In support of its exceptions to the Director's decision 
holding for the District, the Association argues that the 
record does not support a finding that Sharp has a significant 
role in negotiations. In this connection, it points out that 
the former business manager will continue to represent the 
District at the table and that, in any event. Sharp has not yet 
performed any functions in connection with negotiations. In 
further support of its position, it relies upon the Board's 
decision in Hempstead Public Schools. 6 PERB 1f300l (1973). for 
the proposition that a public employer applying for the 
designation as managerial of an employee who is already in a 
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negotiating unit has a very heavy burden. It contends that the 
District has not met this burden with respect to Sharp. 
Having reviewed the record, we affirm the decision of the 
Director. Section 201.7(a) of the Taylor Law provides that a 
person may be designated managerial if he: 
may reasonably be required on behalf of the 
public employer to assist directly in the 
preparation for and conduct of negotiations . . . 
provided that such role is not of a routine or 
clerical nature and requires the exercise of 
independent judgment. 
The record demonstrates that Sharp's role in negotiations with 
the custodial employees satisfies this standard. His 
assignment both requires him to prepare negotiating proposals 
and to provide support to the former business manager during 
the course of negotiations. This assignment is not routine or 
clerical in nature and it requires the exercise of independent 
judgment. 
It is irrelevant that, negotiations not yet having 
commenced. Sharp has not yet performed this assignment. In 
City of Newburqh. 16 PERB 1P053 (1983) at p. 3082. we noted 
that under the Taylor Law: 
an employee may be designated "managerial" on 
the basis of services that may reasonably be 
required of him in the future, while an employee 
may be designated "confidential" only on the 
basis of services already performed. (emphasis 
J. J.J. V J . J.^ J. JL±Ct J. J • 
We conclude that the District satisfied its burden of 
proving that Sharp is a managerial employee. 
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NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER that Thomas Sharp be, and he 
hereby is, designated a managerial 
employee of the District. 
DATED: July 19, 1983 
Albany, New York 
^ 
i£#^r&*Ut^ 
Haj?gld R. Newman, Chairman 
^v<=^ David C.^Randies . Memb 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF BINGHAMTON. 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2771 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION 693. INTERNA-
TIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
CHAUFFEURS. WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS 
OF AMERICA. 
Petitioner, 
-and-
LOCAL UNION 675. AFSCME, AFL-CIO. 
Intervener. 
DAVID M. DUTKO. ESQ., for Employer 
BEINS. AXELROD & OSBORNE. P.C. (HUGH J. BEINS. 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Petitioner 
ROWLEY. FORREST & O'DONNELL, P.C. (BRIAN J. 
O'DONNELL, ESQ. and RONALD G. DUNN. ESQ.. of 
Counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The petition herein was filed by Teamsters Local Union 
693, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Warehousemen and Helpers of America (Local 693) to represent 
a unit of supervisory employees of the City of Binghamton's 
Departments of Public Works, Parks and Water, and its Signal 
Bureau. These employees had been represented by Local Union 
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675, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Local 675), which intervened in the 
proceeding. Local 675 was apparently then merged into Local 
Union 826. AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Local 826). The matter now comes 
to us on the exceptions of Local 826 to an interim decision 
of the Acting Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Acting Director) finding the petition of 
Local 693 timely.-
The City's collective bargaining agreement with Local 
675 expired on December 31. 1983 and under §201.3(e) of our 
rules it, or its successor, had 120 days to conclude a 
successor agreement before Local 693 could file a timely 
petition. No such agreement was reached by then, or by May 
1, 1984, when the petition was filed. Local 826 asserts that 
there was an informal agreement to extend to the supervisors 
the terms of the City's collective bargaining agreement with 
Local 826 covering another unit of public employees, but it 
is clear from the record that no formal agreement was ever 
reached. The alleged informal agreement would not be 
2/ 
sufficient to bar a petition by Local 693.— 
i/The Acting Director issued a consolidated decision 
covering this matter and Case C-2772. a related matter. 
Not having completed our deliberations on C-2772, we 
separate these matters for decision. 
g/Farminqdale UFSD. 7 PERB 1f3073 (1974). 
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ACCORDINGLY. WE AFFIRM the decision of the Acting 
Director, and 
WE REMAND the matter to the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) for further 
proceedings consistent with this decision. 
DATED: July 19. 1984 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
David C. Randle\s. Mem 
MRS 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK, UNIFIED COURT 
SYSTEM 
CASE NO. E-09 69 
Upon the Application for Designation 
of Persons as Managerial or 
Confidential. 
HOWARD A. RUBENSTEIN. ESQ. (ANDREA R. LURIE, ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Employer 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH. ESQS., (MICHAEL J. SMITH. 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On August 30, 1983. the State of New York, Unified Court 
System (UCS) filed an application seeking the designation of 
certain of its employees as managerial or confidential in 
accordance with the criteria set forth in Civil Service Law 
(CSL) §201.7. 
The UCS has filed exceptions to that part of the 
decision of the Acting Director, dated March 27, 1984. which 
found that the record did not warrant a designation that 
Kevin Riley (Riley) and Kevin McGraw (McGraw) are managerial 
employees. 
) 
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The exceptions argue that Riley and McGraw. who are 
employed as assistant court analysts. Salary Grade 14. do 
meet the criteria of CSL §201.7(a)(i) for designation as 
managerial employees because they formulate policy in that 
they participate with regularity in the process of 
determining the methods and means by which the State can-
achieve its objective of improving the delivery of justice in 
the town and village courts. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the 
exceptions, we affirm the determination of the Acting 
Director. 
The record discloses that Riley and McGraw. basically, 
gather data on issues of concern to local magistrates and 
report the results to their superiors within UCS. The title 
standards for the position indicate that the role of 
assistant court analyst is to "provide professional level 
assistance to Court Analysts and higher level personnel" 
concerning various projects. The Acting Director, upon 
consideration of the evidence, found that the record did not 
establish that Riley and McGraw have the authority to 
formulate policy. The exceptions and argument of the 
employer do not persuade us otherwise. 
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NOW. THEREFORE. WE AFFIRM the decision of the Acting 
Director and we ORDER that the exceptions herein be, and the 
same hereby are, dismissed. 
DATED: July 19. 1984 
Albany. New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF ROCHESTER. 
Respondent. 
-and- CASE NO. U-73 96 
AFSCME. NY. COUNCIL 66. LOCAL 163 5, 
CITY OF ROCHESTER CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES, 
Charging Party. 
BARRY C. WATKINS. ESQ.. for Respondent 
JOEL M. POCH. ESQ.. for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of AFSCME, 
NY, Council 66. Local 1635. City of Rochester Civilian 
Employees (Local 1635) to a decision of the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
which dismissed its improper practice charge against the 
City of Rochester (City) for failure to state a cause of 
action. The charge alleged that the City violated 
§209-a.l (a) and (d) of the Act when, without prior 
negotiations with Local 1635, it entered into an arrangement 
with the Monroe County Sheriff by which some of the 
Sheriff's "911 dispatchers" would receive training while 
working alongside the City's 911 dispatchers. The City's 
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") 
dispatchers are members of a negotiating unit represented by 
Local 1635. 
We agree with the Director that Local 1635's charge 
fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of 
action. While the charge asserts that the City had an 
obligation to negotiate, it does not allege facts which 
might suggest a basis in law to support that conclusion. 
In certain circumstances, the assignment of new and 
unfamiliar duties to unit employees may be a negotiable 
decision. Even were we to infer from the charge that the 
City's dispatchers are training the Sheriff's dispatchers, 
the Director correctly pointed out that the charge fails to 
) allege that such work is unrelated to the essential duties 
and functions of the City's dispatchers and also fails to 
allege that this assignment represents any departure from 
their ordinary duties.— 
The unilateral assignment of "unit work" to nonunit 
2/ . . . . 
employees— may also be a negotiable decision in 
1/Waverly CSD. 10 PERB 1f3103 (1977); Town of Oyster 
Bay. 12 PERB ir3086 (1979). 
i-^ The charge alleges that the Sheriff's dispatchers 
will "ultimately" become City employees. Should this 
occur, the new employees might be covered under the 
recognition clause of the parties' agreement, or might be 
subject to placement in Local 1635's unit via the filing of 
a representation petition. We note that such a unit 
placement petition has been filed by Local 1635 and is 
pending before the Director (Case No. CP-044). 
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certain fact situations. The instant charge, however, 
neither alleges that the arrangement between the City and 
the Sheriff resulted in any reduction in the size of Local 
1635's negotiating unit, nor alleges that the arrangement 
3/ 
caused work to be removed from that unit.— In fact, the 
charge contains an allegation that the arrangement increased 
the workload of unit employees, presumably through the need 
to train the Sheriff's dispatchers or aid them in the 
performance of their duties. While this allegation may well 
constitute negotiable "impact", the Director correctly noted 
that the charge fails to allege that Local 1635 ever 
demanded negotiations on the impact of this arrangement or 
that the City ever refused to negotiate such impact. In 
sum, the charge fails to allege any facts sufficient to 
state a violation of §209-a.l(d). 
In its exceptions. Local 1635 also complains that its 
charge alleged, and the Director ignored, a "per se" 
violation of §209-a.l(a). In this regard, it argues that by 
avoiding the obligation to negotiate, the City intended to 
1/North Shore UFSD. 10 PERB ir3082 (1977). 11 PERB 
V3011 (1978); Northport UFSD. 9 PERB 1[3003 (1976). affirmed 
54 AD2d 935 (2nd Dept. 1976). 9 PERB T7021; East Ramapo 
CSD. 10 PERB 1f3064 (1977). 
_ Q 
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"undermine the ability of Local 1635 to represent its 
bargaining unit employees." This argument, however, assumes 
that a negotiating obligation existed and, as already 
discussed, the charge does not appear to state facts from 
which such an obligation can be discerned. Moreover, a 
failure to negotiate does not give rise to a per se 
violation of §209-a.l(a). 
Finally, the exceptions complain of the Director's 
summary dismissal, particularly in light of the City's 
alleged failure to answer the improper practice charge. 
This exception lacks merit because §204.2(a) of our Rules of 
Procedure specifically authorizes the Director to screen 
improper practice charges prior to joinder of issue, and to 
dismiss those charges that, as a matter of law, do not 
allege facts sufficient to constitute an improper practice. 
Under §204.3 of our Rules, the City's obligation to answer 
was dependent upon its receipt of a copy of the charge from 
the Director. Since the Director had found the charge to be 
deficient and therefore was not processing it further, he 
merely sent an informational copy to the City with specific 
directions that the City was not required to take any action 
thereon. As such, it was not obligated to answer the charge. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be. and 
it hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: July 19. 19 84 
Albany, New York 
HaroLeb R, Newman. Chairman 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
EAST AURORA POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7009 
VILLAGE OF EAST AURORA. 
Charging Party. 
DAMON & MOREY. ESQ. (JAMES N. SCHMIT, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Charging Party 
SARGENT & REPKA. P.C. (NICHOLAS J. SARGENT. ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Village 
of East Aurora (Village) to the decision of the Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its charge against the East Aurora 
Police Benevolent Association (PBA). alleging that the PBA 
had failed to negotiate in good faith by submitting to 
interest arbitration, during the term of their collective 
bargaining agreement, a demand for improvement in the 
existing retirement plan. 
The issues presented by this case arise out of a clause 
in the parties' contract which provided: 
Both parties agree that negotiations will 
be commenced at least one hundred twenty 
(120) days prior to June 1, 1983 to 
.,. Q1 
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discuss the twenty (20) year retirement 
plan or such other retirement plans 
offered by the New York State Policemen 
and Firemen Retirement System. 
Pursuant to this clause, the parties met on eight 
occasions between February 9 and June 20, 1983 to negotiate 
concerning a 20-year retirement plan. The Village took the 
position that it would not agree to such a plan unless the 
PBA granted concessions from the existing contract. In 
July, the PBA requested mediation; however, the Village did 
not attend the scheduled mediation session. Thereupon, the 
PBA filed a petition for compulsory interest arbitration, 
which the Village blocked through the filing of the instant 
improper practice charge. 
The essence of the Village's exceptions is based upon 
its position that the quoted clause gives rise to a 
contractual obligation rather than a statutory obligation 
to negotiate the demand; that PERB has no jurisdiction to 
interpret the contract, and hence no jurisdiction to 
address the issue. 
Upon review of the record, we affirm the findings of 
the ALJ, including her credibility determinations and 
conclusions of law. We agree, and the record sustains the 
finding, that the parties intended by the above-quoted 
clause to reopen negotiations on the retirement issue. 
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The ALJ correctly noted that while §205.5(d) of 
Article 14 of the Civil Service Law denies to the Board the 
authority to enforce an agreement, it does not preclude the 
Board from exercising jurisdiction to determine whether an 
alleged violation of such an agreement would otherwise also 
constitute an improper practice.— a role specifically 
contemplated by the law. The position of the Village that 
the ALJ should have exercised her discretion in favor of 
deferring to arbitration lacks consistency, for it cannot 
file an improper practice charge asking us to address the 
issue and, at the same time, argue that we should defer or 
have no jurisdiction to address its merits. 
ACCORDINGLY. WE AFFIRM the decision of the ALJ and WE 
ORDER that the charge herein be, and it 
hereby is. DISMISSED. 
DATED: July 19, 1984 
Albany, New York 
Tfa^iJzM &//,«> 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
David C. Randies>-Membe 
1/Hunter -Tanner svi lie Teachers Assn. . 16 PERB ir3109 
(19 83 )7™~~* " ' 
i 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ADDISION CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Respondent. 
-and- CASE NOS. U-7011. 
IL-X03 5 &-U---Z0-47-- -
ADDISON TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION. NEA/NY. 
Charging Party. 
R. WHITNEY MITCHELL, for Respondent 
JOHN B. SCHAMEL, for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Addison Teachers' Association. NEA/NY (Association) 
filed five charges between August 24 and October 23. 1983 
against the Addison Central School District (District).— 
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) consolidated the charges 
and conducted a hearing, after which he found the following 
violations to which the District takes exceptions: 
1) The District refused to process grievances during the 
life of the collective bargaining agreement and after it 
expired. The ALJ found that the refusal during the life of 
the agreement was of such magnitude as to constitute not 
i^The charge in Case No. U-7011 was withdrawn; the 
charge in Case No. U-7090 is not before us as no exception 
was filed to the ALJ's disposition of it. 
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merely a violation of the parties' contract, but also a 
repudiation of it. Accordingly, he found that the District's 
conduct in this regard violated §209-a.1(a). (d) and (e) of 
the Taylor Law. 
2) The District refused to furnish relevant information 
to the Association during negotiations in violation of 
§209-a.l(d) of the statute. 
3) The District unilaterally extended the number of days 
of the work year from 184 to 186 in violation of §209-a.l(d) 
of the Law. 
4) The District Superintendent attempted to intimidate 
unit employees by reason of their union activities in 
violation of §209-a.l(a) of the Law. 
The primary focus of the District's exceptions is on a 
2/ procedural matter.— It sought permission to file an 
amended answer and to reopen the cases after the close of the 
hearing and the filing of briefs, but before the ALJ issued 
his decision. The ALJ rejected that request. The District 
argues that this rejection was a prejudicial error. It points 
to §204.3(d) of our Rules of Procedure which provides that an 
answer may be amended "for good cause shown at any 
time . . . prior to the issuance of the ALJ's decision . . . ." 
Much of the rest of the District's position is that it never 
.i/The Association has moved us to reject the 
District's exceptions on the ground that they were filed 
late. Finding that the exceptions were timely filed, we 
deny the motion. 
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had an opportunity to raise arguments or present facts in its 
defense because those arguments and facts would have been based 
upon allegations made in its proposed amended answer. 
We reject this aspect of the exceptions. No good cause 
has been shown for the granting of the amendment at so late a 
date. There is no indication that the arguments or facts were 
not known to, or knowable by. the District before the hearing 
was concluded. Furthermore, insofar as they are asserted in 
the exceptions, the facts and arguments which the District 
would have presented would have been relevant to the District's 
defense against the Association's charges even without the 
amendments, and there is not even an allegation that the ALJ 
refused to permit the introduction of such evidence or the 
making of such arguments. Indeed, the record would not support 
such an allegation. 
The District also excepts to the ALJ having found a 
violation by reason of its refusal to process grievances. The 
District argues that because in two specific situations, 
arbitrators had found this conduct to have violated the 
parties' contract, the ALJ's decision would impose "excessive, 
unwarranted, dual penalties." The District appears to be 
arguing that the ALJ should have deferred to the arbitrators in 
accordance with our decision in New York City Transit 
Authority. 4 PERB ir3031 (1971). 
We are not persuaded by this argument. Deferral is 
discretionary and is not usually applied when a violation of 
Q 
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§209-a.l(a) is alleged, as it is here. The arbitrators 
remedied violations of the contract. We are remedying flagrant 
violations of §209-a.l(a), (d) and (e) of the Law. 
The District next claims that some of the information 
sought by the Association did not exist and other information 
was supplied in a timely fashion. Apparently recognizing that 
there is no support for this claim in the record, the District 
argues that this would have been dealt with under the amended 
answer. This argument is disposed of by our rejection of the 
District's first exception. 
The District asserts that the work year was not extended 
because there had not been any set work year in the past. This 
) claim, too. is based on information that is not in the record. 
The District's last exception is that the evidence on 
which the ALJ relied to find that the superintendent engaged in 
intimidating conduct is not reliable in that it merely consists 
of the testimony of two long-time union activists. There is no 
basis in the record for rejecting this testimony. 
We also have before us cross-exceptions of the Association 
in which it argues that the conduct of the District was so 
destructive of the employees' Taylor Law rights that we should 
"strengthen the penalties set forth in the Administrative Law 
Judge's Order . . . ." (emphasis added). More specifically, it 
urges us to award it interest on the money which the two 
arbitrators had directed the District to pay it by reason of 
the District's failure to process grievances. 
Q 
Board - U-7011. U-7035 6, U-7047 -5 
This argument is based upon a misunderstanding of the 
responsibility of this Board in improper practice cases. The 
Taylor Law authorizes this Board to remedy improper conduct. 
but it does not authorize us to impose penalties for such 
3/ 
conduct.— Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the District and its agents 
cease and desist: 
1. From interfering with, restraining or 
coercing public employees in the exercise 
of their rights guaranteed in section two 
hundred two for the purpose of depriving 
them of such rights; 
2. From refusing to negotiate in good faith 
with the Addison Teachers' Association; 
3. From refusing to continue all the terms of 
an expired agreement until a new agreement 
is negotiated; 
4. From failing and refusing to consider the 
settlement of grievances, and from failing 
and refusing to administer and participate 
in the grievance procedure as provided in 
the expired agreement; 
5. From failing and refusing to furnish 
information reasonably necessary to the 
conduct of collective negotiations and the 
administration of grievances; and 
l/civil Service Law §205.5(d) authorized this Board 
to direct "an offending party to cease and desist from any 
improper practice, and to take such affirmative action as 
will effectuate the r,olicies of this article (but not to 
assess exemplary damages) . . . ." 
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6. From extending the work year beyond 184 
days and to compensate those teachers who 
worked in excess thereof at their 
pro-rated salaries with interest at the 
legal rate; 
4/ WE FURTHER ORDER the District to post the notice attached-
in all places normally "used for communication 
with unit employees. 
DATED: July 19. 1984 
Albany. New York 
4.^ The notice also refers to a violation found by the 
ALJ to which the District filed no exceptions. 
APPENDIX 
PLQYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify our employees in the unit represented by the Addison 
Teachers' Association, NEA/NY'.> that the Addison Central School 
District and its agents: 
1. Will not interfere with, restrain or coerce public employees in the exercise 
of their rights guaranteed in section two hundred two for the purpose of depriving 
them of such rights; 
2. Will not refuse to negotiate in good faith with the Addison Teachers' Association: 
3. Will not refuse to continue all the terms of the expired agreement until a new 
agreement is negotiated; 
4. Will not fail and refuse to consider the settlement of grievances or fail or 
refuse to administer and participate in the grievance procedure as provided in 
the expired agreement; 
5. Will not fail and refuse to furnish information reasonably necessary to the 
conduct of collective negotiations and the administration of grievances; 
6. Will not require the unilateral increase in student-contact minutes during 
duty-free time without negotiations, and 
7. Will not extend the work year beyond 184 days without negotiations. 
ADDISON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Dated. By. 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. Qfi -*yft 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
THE MERRICK LIBRARY. 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2705 
THE MERRICK LIBRARY STAFF ASSOCIATION. 
Petitioner. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On November 23, 1983. the Merrick Library Staff 
Association (petitioner) filed, in accordance with the 
Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board 
(Rules) a timely petition for certification as the 
exclusive negotiating representative of certain employees 
employed by the Merrick Library (employer). 
Thereafter, the parties agreed to a negotiating unit 
as follows: 
Included: All full-time and regular 
part-time employees in the following 
titles: Librarians. Principal Librarian 
Clerk, Clerk, Principal Clerk. Typist/Clerk. 
Clerk/Illustrator. 
Excluded: All other employees, including 
employees working 24 or fewer hours per 
month. Library Director, pages, custodial 
employees. Secretary to the Director, 
Assistant to the Secretary to the Director 
(Accounts Clerk). 
Pursuant to agreement, a secret ballot election was 
held on February 9, 1984, at which there were 14 ballots 
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cast in favor of representation by petitioner. 15 ballots 
against representation by petitioner, and one challenged 
ballot.-' 
Inasmuch as the results of the election do not 
indicate that the majority of eligible voters in the 
agreed-upon unit who cast ballots desire to be represented 
for purposes of collective bargaining by the petitioner. IT 
IS ORDERED that the petition should be. and it hereby is. 
dismissed. 
DATED: July 19, 1984 
Albany., New York 
f<&a?-7tc&^~^ 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
David C. Randies, Mem 
1/ Even if the challenged ballot was resolved in 
petitioner's favor, the Rules do not provide for a 
run-off in a "yes-no" election. 
The petitioner filed, but later declined to prosecute, 
objections to employer conduct affecting the results 
of the election. All of these objections were 
factually controverted. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF ERIE. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7414 
BRIAN LIEBLER. RALPH GRZEDZICKI. AND 
PAUL HEJNA. 
Charging Parties. 
BRIAN LIEBLER. pro se 
RALPH GRZEDZICKI. p_ro se 
PAUL HEJNA. pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
charging parties to a decision of the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing 
their charge that the respondent violated §209-a.l(a) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act by changing their 
check-off from dues to agency shop fee, without their 
consent, following their expulsion from the Civil Service 
Employees Association (CSEA). Their expulsion resulted from 
their unsuccessful attempt to fragment a CSEA unit and 
m^ 
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certify a different union as the representative of the 
fragmented unit.— 
Improper practice charges filed by the same charging 
parties against CSEA because of their expulsion and the 
resultant collection of agency shop fees from them as 
2/ 
non-members, were also dismissed by the Director.— In a 
companion decision issued today, we have affirmed that 
3/ dismissal.— For the reasons set forth m that decision, 
we found that the expulsion did not violate the Act and that 
CSEA is entitled to collect the agency shop fees. 
It follows that the deduction of the agency shop fees 
and their transmission to CSEA by the respondent is 
permissible under the Act. In fact, the respondent is 
obligated pursuant to Sections 201.2(b), 208.3(b) and 
209-a.l(e) of the Act to deduct agency shop fees from the 
^ ^ - 4 / 
charging parties.— 
i/The separate unit was denied in County of Erie. 
17 PERB 1P020 (1984) . 
i/civil Service Employees Association. Inc., 
17 PERB 1f4568. 
3/Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
17 PERB IP 072. 
I/Section 209-a.l(e) became applicable when the 
contract between the respondent and CSEA, which contains an 
agency shop fee provision, expired on December 31, 1983. 
Q1 
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NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: July 19, 19 84 
Albany. New York 
irold R. Newman. Chairman 
David C. Randies ,\ Member 
m,,... 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. 
INC.. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NOS. U-7411. 
U-7412 & U-7413 
BRIAN LIEBLER. RALPH GRZEDZICKI AND 
PAUL HEJNA. 
Charging Parties. 
ROEMER AND FEATHERSTONHAUGH. P.C. (PAULINE ROGERS 
KINSELLA, ESQ.. of Counsel), for Respondent 
BRIAN LIEBLER. pro. se 
RALPH GRZEDZICKI. pro se 
PAUL HEJNA, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the joint exceptions of the 
three charging parties to a Director's decision which 
dismissed their consolidated charges against the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc. (CSEA) for failure to 
state facts sufficient to constitute a violation of the Act. 
The charging parties were members and/or officers of Local 
815, CSEA. which represented a unit of Erie County correction 
officers. All three actively supported a rival employee 
organization's challenge to Local 815's representative 
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status. The efforts of the charging parties to decertify 
Local 815 resulted in their being charged by CSEA with aiding 
a competing labor organization in violation of the CSEA 
constitution. They were each found guilty of disloyalty by 
CSEA's Judicial Board, which ordered their expulsion from 
CSEA membership. Pursuant to its collective agreement with 
Erie County. Local 815 subsequently collected the proceeds of 
an agency shop fee deduction from each of the charging 
parties. 
There are three basic aspects to the charges herein, 
each of which, according to the charging parties, involves a 
violation of CSL §209-a.2(a). They may be stated as follows: 
1. The expulsion of the charging parties from 
membership and that aspect of CSEA's 
constitution which permits such expulsion 
are per se violative of the Act because 
they interfere with the employee's §202 
right to participate in any employee 
organization of their own choosing; 
2. The expulsion was improper because CSEA 
later collected an agency shop fee from 
the charging parties; and 
3. The collection of the agency shop fee by 
CSEA was improper because CSEA chose to 
expel the charging parties from 
membership.-^/ 
i^This contention was specifically advanced only by 
Grzedzicki, who argued that we should outright excise the 
expulsion provision from CSEA's constitution or invalidate 
it "until such time that agency shop regulations are 
altered to allow for some type of financial accommodations 
for those who are expelled". 
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The Director dismissed the charges prior to joinder of 
issue. Pie held that complaints which are based only upon 
expulsion from union membership raise issues related to 
internal union affairs, which are beyond this Board's 
jurisdiction. He further held that §208.3 of the Taylor 
Law does not preclude an employee organization from 
collecting agency shop fees from employees who were 
expelled from union membership for permissible cause. 
We affirm the Director's decision. With respect to 
the first two aspects of the charges noted above, we have 
repeatedly refused to entertain complaints about internal 
union discipline or other internal union affairs which 
neither affect an employee's terms and conditions of 
employment nor violate any fundamental purposes or policies 
2/ . . . . 
of the Act.— There is no allegation in this case that 
the charging parties' expulsion for disloyalty had any 
effect upon their employment relationship. Neither does 
such expulsion impinge upon the basic policies and rights 
set out in §202 of the Taylor Law. The grant to employees 
of the right to join and participate in any employee 
organization does not preclude a union from the exercise of 
£/civil Service Employees Assn.. Inc., 9 PERB 1f3064 
(1976); Buffalo Sewer Authority, 13 PERB V3052 (1980); Half 
Hollow Hills Community Library District, 13 PERB ^3104 
(1980). See also. Opinion of Counsel, 14 PERB 1f5004 (1981). 
Board - U-7411, U-7412 & U-7413 
self-governance, which may include the placement of 
reasonable conditions upon continued membership. 
Furthermore, the expulsion is not rendered improper merely 
because Local 815 was entitled to receive an agency shop 
fee from non-members pursuant to its contract with the 
County of Erie. Were there any impropriety in this 
combination of circumstances, it would lie in the 
collection of the fee, and not in the expulsion. 
In this latter regard, however, we find no impropriety 
in Local 815's collection of an agency shop fee from the 
charging parties after expelling them from membership, and 
therefore find no merit in the last aspect of the charges 
herein. The Director correctly noted that §208.3 of the 
Act. which authorizes the deduction of agency shop fees 
from non-members, does not contain any language precluding 
an employee organization from receiving an agency shop fee 
from an employee whose membership was terminated by the 
employee organization; nor can any such limitation be found 
in §201.2(b) of the Act, which defines "agency shop fee 
deduction". The Taylor Law thereby differs from private 
sector labor relations statutes, such as the Railway Labor 
Act and the National Labor Relations Act. These statutes 
specifically preclude the application of union security 
agreements to employees whose membership is terminated for 
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any reason other than the failure to pay dues, fees and 
3/ 
assessments.— The statutory provisos are necessary in 
the private sector where it is permissible to condition an 
employee's continued employment upon membership in the 
union. Were a union able to deny membership or expel a 
member on the basis of the employee's organizational 
efforts on behalf of a rival union, and then obtain the 
employee's discharge from employment on the basis of 
non-membership, the employee's protected right to organize 
would be completely emasculated. No such danger exists 
under the Taylor Law. which does not permit non-membership 
to have any employment consequences. Hence, there does not 
appear to be any policy reason which would support reading 
a comparable proviso into the Taylor Law. 
The charging parties' other exceptions also lack 
merit. While they argue that their agency shop fees may 
not be used for contract administration on their behalf, it 
is well established that the union's duty of fair 
representation extends to all employees in the negotiating 
4/ unit, including non-members of the union.— 
I/Railway Labor Act. §2. eleventh; National Labor 
Relations Act. §§8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2). See. Communications 
Workers v. NLRB. 520 F.2d 411 (2d Cir., 1975). cert. den. 
423 US 1041 (1976); Klemens v. Air Line Pilots Assn.. 
113 LRRM 2825 (W.D. Wash., 1981). 
i/piainview-Old Bethpaae CSD. 7 PERB 1P058 (1974): 
Brighton Transportation Association. 10 PERB 1f3090 (1977); 
Nassau Educational Chapter. 11 PERB 1f30l0 (1978). 
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The charging parties also complain that the Director 
failed to give them a hearing, but §204.2(a) of our Rules 
of Procedure specifically authorizes him to dismiss a 
charge prior to fixing a hearing date if it fails to state 
facts sufficient to constitute a violation of the Act. 
Finally, while the charging parties complain that they 
were not afforded "due process" in the CSEA expulsion 
proceeding, this claim was never raised in their improper 
practice charges and may not be raised for the first time 
in their exceptions. 
WOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charges herein be. and 
they hereby are, dismissed. 
DATED: July 19. 1984 
Albany. New York 
fnn<^\. 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
David C. Randles> MembeTr 
t**J 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF CAMPBELL. 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2767 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 529, 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS. 
CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS 
OF AMERICA. 
Petitioner, 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On June 1. 1984, our Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation issued a decision in which he found that Local 
529 met the requirements of §201.9(g)(1) of our Rules of 
Procedure for certification without an election as the 
representative of the bargaining unit agreed to by the parties. 
He then forwarded the record of the proceeding to the Board for 
issuance of a certification order. 
Since we have not yet issued a certification order and we 
have received information which may indicate that Local 529 no 
longer meets the requirements of Rule 201.9(g)(1), the matter is 
88 
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remanded to our Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation for further investigation. 
DATED: July 19. 1984 
Albany, New York 
) 
